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Chapter 11
Adopting Hybrid Pension Plans: Effects of
Economic Crisis and Regulatory Reform
Robert L. Clark, Alan Glickstein, and Tomeka Hill
Beginning in the mid-1980s, many large US employers began converting
traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plans to hybrid plans, primarily
cash balance plans. While legally these are DB plans, hybrids have impor-
tant characteristics that mimic defined contribution (DC) plans.1 The first
hybrid plan was created by BankAmerica in 1985, and over the next few
years, only a few companies adopted hybrid plans. But the 1990s saw a surge
in hybrid plan adoptions and by May 1999, there were at least 325 hybrid
plans (Pensions and Investments, 1999). Adoptions of hybrid pension plans
continued through 2003, before coming to a relative standstill, primarily
due to concerns about the legal status of some of the plan characteristics.
Prior research has sought to explain the attraction of hybrid plans and to
identify the primary reasons that US employers converted traditional DB to
hybrids prior to 2003. Clark and Schieber (2002) describe the conversion
to hybrid plans as an effective method of moving away from the incentives
for early retirement (i.e. prior to age 65) imbedded in most traditional DB
plans. Clark and Schieber (2004) provide an early history of the adoption
of hybrid plans and an assessment of the key factors driving firms away from
traditional DB plans and toward the adoption of hybrid plans. They point
to changing accounting rules, increasing preferences by workers for more
mobile pensions, shifts in compensation packages that reduced resources
allocated to retirement plans, and the overfunded status of some of the
traditional plans. Clark et al. (2001) also highlighted the importance of
effective communication concerning the value of retirement benefits and
noted that the basic characteristics of hybrid plans are easier for workers to
understand.2
IBM’s conversion to a cash balance plan in 1999 caused considerable
controversy and resulted in a series of lawsuits and Congressional hearings,
raising questions about whether hybrid plans might be in violation of
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and age discrimina-
tion standards. McGill et al. (2010) summarize key aspects of the contro-
versy over hybrid plans, their legal status, and their impact on employee
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benefits and firm costs. The legal uncertainty surrounding these plans
resulted in a sharp decline in plan conversions between 2004 and 2006.
This chapter first discusses the legal controversy over conversions to
hybrid plans and then explains how the Pension Protection Act of 2006
(PPA) resolved these issues. We then review how the economic crisis
impacted pension funding and influenced the ways in which sponsors
redesigned their retirement plans. Next, we examine the trend in plan
conversions since 2000. Using pension data from Form 5500 datafiles and
financial as well as other information on Fortune 1000 companies, we
examine the determinants of plan conversions and consider the impact of
legislation confirming the legal status of hybrid plans and the impact of
the economic crisis.
Legal status of hybrid plans and the Pension
Protection Act
As noted above, a long period of regulatory uncertainty in the United States
suppressed the rate of adoption of hybrid plans, especially when the legal
status of these plans was being challenged in the courts. Three primary
issues posed questions about their legal status. First, opponents argued that
hybrid plans were age discriminatory, because younger participants
received more interest credits than those near retirement. Under the law
at that time, a benefit payable from a DB plan was normally described as a
benefit payable at retirement age. For example, if a 25-year-old employee
and a 60-year-old employee both began accruing a hybrid plan benefit at
the same time, when they reached retirement age, say age 65, the 25-year-
old would have a larger benefit because he had forty years to accrue,
compared to the 60-year-old, who only had five years to accrue. Thus, stated
as a retirement-age benefit, the younger employee’s benefit was much
larger than the older employee’s benefit—suggesting to some that hybrid
plans appeared age discriminatory.
Second, the method of conversion from a traditional DB plan benefit to
a hybrid plan also became controversial. Under a common conversion
technique, a hybrid plan participant was credited with an initial hypotheti-
cal or ‘notional’ account. For some participants, this opening balance was
less than the present value of the accrued benefit under the traditional DB
plan at the point of conversion. As a result, that participant would not
accrue any additional future benefits from the plan until the hybrid plan
benefit caught up to the value of the traditional DB plan benefit at the time
of conversion resulting in what became known as ‘wear-away’. For some
participants, the net effect of the wear-away was that benefit accruals were
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temporarily frozen and this freeze would sometimes last for years. Some
argued that this violated the rules against backloading benefits.
Third, plan sponsors were worried about what was termed a ‘whipsaw
effect’. This occurred because plans were required by the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) to calculate a participant’s actual benefit payment by project-
ing the participant’s hypothetical notional account balance to normal
retirement age using the plan’s interest crediting rate, converting that
amount to an annuity payable at normal retirement age, and then discount-
ing it back to a present value amount based on statutory defined interest
rates. The greater of the resulting calculation or the notional account
balance was then paid. This often resulted in a benefit payment greater
than the participant’s hypothetical account balance, which plan sponsors
did not like as it was contrary to what the plan communicated and intended
to pay and was not expected by the plan participants.
Eventually, the US federal circuit courts determined that hybrid plans
were not age discriminatory and Congress further clarified the legal status
of hybrid plans in 2006 when it signed the PPA.3 The PPA addressed various
issues regarding retirement plans, but a subset of PPA provisions dealing
with certain selected design aspects of hybrid plans provided plan sponsors
some guidance on how to administer the new regulations.4 For the first
time, the PPA provided an age discrimination safe harbor for hybrid plans
encompassing essentially all existing designs (Hill et al., 2010). The Act also
stated that the participant’s total accrued benefit cannot be less than the
participant’s accrued benefit for years of service before the effective date of
the amendment plus the participant’s accrued benefit for years of service
after the effective date of the amendment. This essentially eliminated
‘wear-away’. The PPA further provided a path to eliminate the notion of
‘whipsaw’ by providing rules under which plans could simply pay the
account balance out to participants, if a lump-sum payment is chosen,
upon termination of employment.
In addition, the Act imposed a new requirement on hybrid plans—the
notion of a market rate of interest. Interest credits under cash balance
plans cannot exceed the (unspecified in the law) market rate of interest,
generally from 2008. The law also required faster vesting for cash balance
plans. While the elimination of these key uncertainties is a welcome devel-
opment, as of this writing, critical final regulations implementing the
principles of PPA have still not been issued in several key areas, notably
the market rate of return requirement. So the true impact on plan conver-
sions reflecting the regulatory clarity provided by PPA may not be seen for
some time. Thus, one can only speculate on the actual number of conver-
sions that might have occurred had this uncertainty been resolved more
quickly. Many of the plan sponsors who chose to terminate their DB plan
and adopt a DC plan instead of converting the existing DB plan to a hybrid
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plan during the long period of regulatory uncertainty probably will not
consider reestablishing a DB plan in the near future.
The economic crisis changed how companies looked
at retirement plan design
When the PPA passed in 2006, many policymakers and economists were
optimistic that the new guidance it provided on hybrid plans would lead
more employers to consider hybrid plans as an option, and, indeed, the
number of conversions rose in the last part of that decade. Yet the motiva-
tions for converting to a hybrid plan were starkly different than the earlier
part of the decade due to the economic crisis. As noted earlier, employers
converted to hybrid plans in the early part of the decade, in part, as a way of
eliminating early-retirement subsidies, in response to changing demo-
graphics and related cost pressures, to shift to compensation packages
that reduced dollars allocated to DB retirement plans, and to have access
to assets that were in overfunded traditional DB plans. Other motivations
included the popularity of lump sums and the desire for greater portability
of benefits. When the economic crisis hit, however, employers began to
look at their pension plans in a different way.
The economic crisis led to a huge drop in the value of equities, causing
many pensions to experience a decline in funding. This was exacerbated by
a drop in long-term interest rates used to discount plan liabilities. From
end 2007 to end 2008, total assets in US DB pensions dropped 23 percent
(from $2.6 trillion to $2.0 trillion; DOL, 2010). When corporate pension
plans are underfunded, companies are required by IRS regulations to
invest fresh capital into the funds to correct the imbalance in the forth-
coming years. Thus, many firms were required to increase their contribu-
tion rates. Moreover, the timing of this crisis was coupled with new PPA
funding rules, shortening the amount of time during which funding short-
falls need to be made up. As a result, many plan sponsors found it difficult
to come up with the increased contributions needed to improve their DB
funding levels.
Some firms had to make several drastic changes regarding their pensions
and overall cost structure. First, many employers began laying off workers
and, in some cases, offering early-retirement windows to help reduce their
overall compensation costs. Second, some employers sought ways to
reduce their benefit obligations, redesigning programs to reduce benefits,
including temporary measures such as suspending matching contributions
to 401(k) plans. In the later part of the decade, plan sponsors continued to
move away from traditional DB plans and more toward offering hybrid
plans and offering DC-only designs. Fortunately, the advent of the PPA gave
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plan sponsors an enhanced option to use hybrid plans when redesigning
their retirement programs, and there was some increase in hybrid plan
conversions. The timeline for making major changes to a pension program
is significant (typically more than a year), and, as noted above, there remain
regulatory uncertainties which still inhibit some cash balance conversions.
So it remains to be seen what long-term impact the financial crisis will have
on pension design generally and cash balance conversions specifically.
Hybrid plans: 2000–9
Since their creation, hybrid pension plans were mainly adopted by large
employers in the United States. For the most part, hybrid plans result from
plan sponsors having had traditional DB plans and then converting them
to hybrid plans. In this sense, relatively few firms have selected hybrid plans
as their initial pension structure. To examine the growth of hybrid plans in
the last decade, we rely on three datasets. First, we use Form 5500 datafiles
(annual government filings required from all private employer retirement
plan sponsors) for all plan sponsors with nonfrozen plans having over 1,000
total participants; these cover the period 2000–7 in accessible form and
contain information about pensions at the plan level. Second, we employ
the Towers Watson pension finance data source with information about
Fortune 1000 companies offering at least one traditional DB plan for the
period 2000–9. This source allows us to focus on large employers who
initially offered a traditional DB retirement plan, and it allows us to deter-
mine which converted to hybrid plans; this file contains company-level
financial information. Third, we integrate the Towers Watson pension
finance data with all nonfrozen plans sponsored in the Form 5500 data-
base, linking financial information for the Fortune 1000 companies and
information about the pension plans they sponsor.
In constructing the first data source of all plans with 1,000+ participants
from the Form 5500 datafiles, we include all plans having 1,000+ and some
positive number of active participants in each year. The Form 5500 datafile
has indicators identifying whether the pension plan is a DB plan, and if so,
whether it is a hybrid. Responses to these indicators are used to separate
traditional DB from hybrid plans.5 The Towers Watson pension finance
database is a collection of pension finance and company finance informa-
tion for Fortune 1000 companies that sponsor a DB pension plan. The
information comes from publicly available annual 10-K reports with
detailed information about the company’s business, finance, and manage-
ment (filed with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)).
In order to integrate the Form 5500 and the Towers Watson pension
finance datasets, information from the Towers Watson file was added to the
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Form 5500 datafiles using Employer Identification Numbers (EINs). This
database includes company-level information plus information about all
the nonfrozen pension plans they sponsor (not just plans with 1,000+
participants). When developing the datafile using this method, we are
unable to determine all traditional DB and hybrid plans sponsored by
Fortune 1000 companies because some plans are sponsored by subsidiaries
and the EINs for some of these subsidiaries are unknown. But we can match
pension plans in the Form 5500 data with the company financial informa-
tion for over 80 percent of the Fortune 1000 companies that have a pension
in each year of the sample period.
Table 11.1 presents information from the Form 5500 on all nonfrozen
pension plans with 1,000+ participants between 2000 and 2007. Four key
measures of the importance of hybrid plans are shown: the number of
hybrid plans with 1,000+ participants, the proportion of DB plans that
are hybrid plans, the percentage of active participants in DB plans enrolled
in hybrid plans, and the share of total DB assets held in hybrid plans.
The number of hybrid plans grew rapidly from 446 in 2000 to 640 in
2005, but it fell slightly in 2007. The share of hybrid plans among all
large DB plans grew from 11 percent in 2000 to 18 percent in 2007.
While the number of hybrid plans grew, the number of all nonfrozen DB
plans dropped during the 2000s. The proportion of all active DB partici-
pants in hybrid plans increased from 18 to 29 percent from 2000 to 2007. As
one might expect, given the increase in plans and participants, the share of
total assets in hybrid plans also increased, rising from 21 to 33 percent.
Comparing data on plans, participants, and assets, it appears that the
largest DB plans were more likely to have switched to hybrid plans over
the last decade.
Table 11.1 Hybrid plan share of all nonfrozen DB plans with 1,000+ participants:
2000–7
Plan
year
No. of
hybrid
plans
Hybrid
plans as a %
of DB plans
Active participants in hybrid
plans as % of active
participants in DB plans
Assets in hybrid
plans as % of
assets in DB plans
2000 446 11 18 21
2001 510 13 18 21
2002 524 15 21 25
2003 614 16 25 29
2004 611 16 27 30
2005 640 17 27 30
2006 588 17 28 32
2007 583 18 29 33
Source : Authors’ calculations from Form 5500 data (see text).
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We repeat the analysis focusing only on DB plans with Form 5500 data,
sponsored by Fortune 1000 companies for years 2000–7 in Table 11.2. The
plans sponsored by the Fortune 1000 companies are even more likely to
have been converted to hybrid plans, which is evident from all measures
reported. The number of hybrid plans sponsored by Fortune 1000 compan-
ies rose from 134 in 2000 to 207 in 2005. In 2006, the number of hybrid
plans sponsored dropped to 185 and rose to 195 in 2007. The proportion of
DB pensions that are hybrid plans among Fortune 1000 companies
increased from 13 percent in 2000 to 25 percent in 2007. Thus, the Fortune
1000 companies in 2007 are one-third more likely to have a hybrid plan
compared to all plans with 1,000+ participants (25 versus 18 percent). As
the share of hybrid plans increased, so did the percentage of active parti-
cipants that are in hybrid plans. The percentage of active participants in
hybrid plans increased from 27 to 46 percent, indicating that almost half of
all DB participants were enrolled in hybrid plans. The share of total assets
in hybrid plans also increased from 31 to 44 percent during the sample
period.
The movement to hybrid plans varies considerably across the US indus-
try, as indicated in Table 11.3 for 2007. We report the prevalence of hybrid
plans in the Form 5500 dataset (1,000+ participants) for all nonfrozen
pension plans and also for nonfrozen plans sponsored by the Fortune
1000 companies. Among Fortune 1000 companies, hybrid plans range
from less than 10 percent of DB plans in the wholesale sector to approxi-
mately half of plans in the professional and business services sector. While
there are only two health-care firms in the Fortune 1000, both of them
sponsor a hybrid plan. In the property and construction sector, there are
only five employers, and three of them sponsor a hybrid. There are also
Table 11.2 Hybrid plan share of all DB plans in Fortune 1000: 2000–7
Plan
year
No. of
hybrid
plans
Hybrid
plans as a %
of DB plans
Active participants in hybrid
plans as % of active
participants in DB plans
Assets in hybrid
plans as % of
assets in DB plans
2000 134 13 27 31
2001 126 13 25 30
2002 163 17 29 34
2003 192 19 36 37
2004 189 20 39 39
2005 207 23 42 40
2006 185 23 40 39
2007 195 25 46 44
Source : Authors’ calculations from Form 5500 and 10-K data (see text).
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substantial differences by industry, depending on the two samples. In
particular, hybrid plans are much more prevalent for Fortune 1000 com-
panies compared to all plans with 1,000+ participants in retail, financial
services, property and construction, and professional and business
services industries. Industry differences in the adoption of hybrid plans
likely reflect differences in labor market conditions, unionization, demo-
graphics, and turnover rates that vary among the different industry
sectors.
To trace the adoption of hybrid plans over time, we constructed a sample
of Fortune 1000 companies in the datafile 2000–9 and which sponsored
a traditional DB plan in 2000. Some 153 companies offered at least one
traditional DB plan in 2000 and remained on the Fortune 1000 list for all ten
years. By 2009, 38 out of these 153 companies converted at least one of their
Table 11.3 Hybrid plans as percent of DB plans by industry: 2007
Industry No. of
hybrids
in Form
5500
Large hybrid
plans as % of all
large DB plans in
Form 5500
No. of hybrids
sponsored
by Fortune
1000
Hybrid plans as
% of all DB plans
sponsored by
Fortune 1000
Aerospace and
defense
11 23 5 28
Communications/
high technology
40 22 16 24
Energy/utilities/
natural resources
66 35 36 35
Financial services 91 21 25 39
Food services and
beverages
23 11 13 16
Health care 113 23 2 100
Manufacturing 142 17 49 17
Pharmaceuticals 7 18 3 21
Professional and
business services
30 23 7 47
Property and
construction
18 6 3 60
Retail 8 15 6 46
Transportation and
transportation
equipment
28 12 10 23
Wholesale 13 14 2 8
Other 51 15 18 32
Source : Authors’ calculations from Form 5500 Large Plans and Fortune 1000 companies
(see text).
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DB plans to a hybrid over the period (Figure 11.1). Most of these hybrid plan
conversions were done early in the decade (twenty-nine occurred between
2000 and 2003); in 2004–6, only one of these companies converted. Eight
additional conversions took place in the next three years, after the passage of
PPA in 2006 and during the onset of the economic crisis.
Another way to trace the trend in plan conversions is to examine year-to-
year changes from 2000 to 2009. Table 11.4 reports these year-by-year
conversions and reveals the same time pattern of adoption of hybrid
plans as shown in Figure 11.1. Panel A indicates that, between 2000 and
2003, there were forty-one plan conversions to hybrid plans among Fortune
1000 firms, but in the next three years there was only one conversion
per year. Beginning in 2006, plan conversions resumed, although at a
somewhat lower rate than in the earlier period. It is important to note
that although there was a significant number of hybrid plan conversions
among the Fortune 1000 during the early part of the decade, the number
of Fortune 1000 companies offering either a traditional or a hybrid pension
plan dropped 23 percent between 2001 and 2004 (451 to 348 companies).
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Figure 11.1 Number of defined benefit plans, hybrid plans, and hybrid plan
conversions
Source : Authors’ computations (see text).
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During 2004–6, the fraction of Fortune 1000 companies offering a tradi-
tional or hybrid pension plan dropped 11 percent (348 to 309 companies).
When PPA was passed in 2006, many assumed that more employers would
consider converting to hybrid plans as an option when considering rede-
signing their retirement plan (even though some significant regulatory
uncertainties remained). While the economic crisis did see an increase in
the number of hybrid plan conversions, it also accelerated the number of
companies dropping their traditional and hybrid pensions. Thus, Fortune
1000 companies converting to hybrid plans did rise after 2006, but the
number offering either a traditional or hybrid plan dropped sharply by
28 percent in the period 2006–9 (309 to 221 companies). Hence, the
number of nonfrozen DB plans has decreased among Fortune 1000 com-
panies; of those continuing to offer DB plans, more are converting to
hybrid formulas.
Turning to all DB plans appearing in consecutive years of the Form 5500
having 1,000+ participants, we can again ask about conversion rates by year.
Panel B of Table 11.4 shows that 25 out of 2,850 plans converted from a
traditional DB plan to a hybrid plan in 2001, 37 of 2,661 plans did so in
Table 11.4 Pension plan conversions over time
Year Number continued sponsoring
traditional DB plan (active and closed
DB plans)
Number
converted to
hybrid plan
Total
number
Panel A. Fortune 1000 firms
2000–1 433 18 451
2001–2 414 12 426
2002–3 395 11 406
2003–4 347 1 348
2004–5 313 1 314
2005–6 308 1 309
2006–7 288 5 293
2007–8 232 8 240
2008–9 219 2 221
Panel B. Form 5500 pension plans with 1,000+ participants
2000–1 2,850 25 2,875
2001–2 2,661 37 2,698
2002–3 2,659 48 2,707
2003–4 2,993 18 3,011
2004–5 2,937 24 2,961
2005–6 2,618 15 2,633
2006–7 2,475 21 2,496
Source : Authors’ calculations from Form 5500 data (see text).
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2002, and 48 of 2,659 plans did so in 2002. Once again there is a marked
decline in conversion around 2003; however, the decline is not as stark nor
is the rebound as large as in the other data that we have examined, nor is
the trend away from traditional DB plans quite as defined.
We note five important observations from the data presented in this
section. First, the recent history suggests a continued trend toward
greater prevalence of hybrid plans that started in the 1990s. Second,
the trend in greater use of hybrid plans was briefly interrupted between
2003 and 2006 as questions arose concerning the legal status of hybrid
plans. Third, although there were a considerable number of conversions
early in the decade and again in the latter part of the decade, the
motivations for converting to hybrid plans were different. In the early
part of the decade, converting to hybrid plans was motivated, in part, by
assets in overfunded pensions and to meet the demand for workers who
wanted mobile pensions. However, when the economic crisis began, the
motivation for converting was primarily to cut costs. The passing of PPA
in 2006 encouraged some sponsors to consider converting to hybrid
plans as an option rather than not offering DB pensions altogether.
Fourth, the adoption of these plans is greater among larger plans spon-
sored by the Fortune 1000 companies. Fifth, the adoption of hybrid plans
is not uniform across industries. Next, we examine these patterns in more
detail.
Explaining why firms adopt hybrid plans
Policymakers and analysts would benefit from a better understanding of
why employers are converting traditional DB plans into hybrid plans. In
this section, we explore a number of possible explanations.
The decision by plan sponsors to convert DB to hybrid plans is likely
influenced by the plan’s financial status as well as that of the plan
sponsor, changes in the labor force and worker preferences, whether
the plan is collectively bargained, plan size, and, of course, the regu-
latory environment. Nevertheless, it is difficult to obtain information on
all of the determinants of plan conversions, so our empirical analysis is
limited by data availability. Moreover, the time period for assessing plan
conversions is relatively short, though we can capture the time series
break coinciding with the legal uncertainty associated with hybrid plans.
We are able to obtain several variables which can serve as proxies for
plan and employer size, as well as the plan’s and employer’s financial
status. The multivariate statistical analyses uses both datafiles described
above.
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Fortune 1000: DB in 2000, hybrid by 2009
To examine a plan sponsor’s decision to convert from a traditional DB to a
hybrid plan, we estimate a logit equation indicating whether each of the
Fortune 1000 firms having a traditional plan in 2000 had converted to a
hybrid plan by 2009. Potential determinants of plan choice include
the measured pension benefit obligation and the plan’s firm size. Accord-
ingly, we evaluate the ten-year average of the company’s End-of-Year (EOY)
pension benefit obligation (PBO) divided by the company’s market value
(the latter is the market capitalization plus the market value of debt). We
also subtract the EOY PBO from EOY plan assets divided by the market
value of the company and include the ten-year average of this variable in
the regression. We also control on the firm’s average earnings per share
(EPS) and the logarithm of average market value (in $ 2010). Variable
means and medians distinguished by whether the plan was converted to a
hybrid plan or not appear in Table 11.5, Panel A.
The PBO relative to market value is similar for companies that converted
and companies that did not convert. The financial status of the pension
plans relative to the market value shows that plans that were converted to a
hybrid plan were similar to the financial status relative to the market value
for those plans that were not converted; actually both groups had negative
net assets. This may be some indication that large PBOs and overall poor
financial health of pension plans may not be determinants of hybrid plan
conversions. However, EPS and market share may be influential as the
mean for both of these variables are higher for companies that converted
compared with companies that did not convert.
Estimated logit coefficients from our model of plan conversions are
derived from the following model:
yi¼aþbAverageðPBO=MktVal21iþbAverage
ðAssetsPBOÞ=MktVal
i
þbAverageðEPSÞiþblog

AverageðMktValÞ
i
þbIndustryDummiesiþei:::
ð1Þ
where i represents the Fortune 1000 company. As Table 11.6 shows, neither
financial measure of the pension plan or EPS have a significant impact on
the conversion to a hybrid plan. Average market value during the sample
period, by contrast, is significantly negatively associated with the probability
of converting a traditional DB to a hybrid plan. Of the industry codes, only
transportation is statistically significant.
Using the same year-by-year conversion data for Fortune 1000 companies
as discussed previously, we estimated additional plan conversion equations
with the addition of individual year dichotomous variables; here, the
dependent variable indicates whether the sponsor switched from a DB to
a hybrid plan each year during the period 2000–9.
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Table 11.5 Plan features by conversion status: 2000–9
Did not convert to
hybrid plan
Converted to hybrid
plan
Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A. Fortune 1000 companies
Avg PBO/Market Value ($) 0.29 0.16 0.25 0.16
Avg (Pension Assets
—PBO)/MktValue ($)
0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02
Avg MktValue ($) 25,485,367 8,287,465 20,622,479 15,526,278
Avg EPS 6.77 2.37 19.60 2.79
Panel B. Form 5500 pension plans with 1,000+ participants: 2000–7
% Funded 0.94 0.90 1.03 0.97
Actives/retirees 11.05 2.40 10.21 3.27
Total actives 4,168 1,350 7,185 2,945
Total participants 8,522 2,659 14,189 5,029
Total assets ($000) 429,136 102,661 1,060,625 219,522
Collectively bargained 45% n/a 22% n/a
Notes : Panel A: number that did not convert to hybrid = 115; number that did = 38. Panel B:
number that did not convert to hybrid = 19,193; number that did = 118. All dollar values in
$ 2010.
Source : Authors’ calculations (see text).
Table 11.6 Logit regression analysis of the overall probability of hybrid plan
conversion in Fortune 1000 companies: 2000–9
Coefficients Std error
Average PBO/market value 0.289 0.630
Average (pension assets—PBO)/market value 2.22 3.75
Average EPS 0.004 0.004
Ln(average market value) 0.421*** 0.111
Manufacturing 0.059 0.394
Transportation 0.751* 0.409*
Wholesale/retail 0.256 0.766
Finance, business services, and real estate 0.045 0.419
Notes : * denotes significance at 10% level; *** denotes significance at 1% level.
Source : Authors’ calculations (see text).
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yij ¼ Æþ bðPBO=MktValÞij þ b
ðAssets PBOÞ=MaktVal
ij
þbEPS:xij þ blog
ðMktValÞ
ij
þ bDummiesij þ eij
ð2Þ
We first present results without year and industry controls, while the second
model includes both. The results are shown in Table 11.7. As above, the
coefficients on EPS are not significant in all three models. Yet the financial
status terms and benefit obligations are both significant and are positively
associated; these estimates suggest that better-funded plans with larger
total liabilities are more likely to be converted to hybrid plans. The logar-
ithm of the firm’s market value is negative and significant.
Form 5500 plans with 1,000+ participants
Using Form 5500 data for the period 2000–7 allows us to use more demo-
graphic and financial information specific to pension plans. Table 11.5,
Panel B, reports means and medians in this sample, for key variables sorted
again by whether the plans converted to hybrids. Variables include the
number of active participants divided by the number of plan retirees, the
number of active participants, the total number of participants, whether
the plan was collective bargained, total plan assets, and the plan’s funding
level. The latter variable, funding level, is obtained by dividing the plan’s
Table 11.7 Logit regression analysis of the annual probability of hybrid plan
conversion in Fortune 1000 companies: 2000–9
1 2 3
Coefficients Std
error
Coefficients Std
error
Coefficients Std
error
PBO/market value 0.460*** 0.165 0.445*** 0.168 0.511*** 0.178
(Pension assets—
PBO)/market
value
0.875** 0.390 0.890* 0.466 1.031** 0.484
EPS 0 0 6E-05 0.0001 7E-05 0.0001
Ln(market value) 0.178*** 0.050 0.171*** 0.050 0.097* 0.055
Year controls No Yes Yes
Industry controls No No Yes
2 log L 1,775.393 1,601.97 1,576.086
Notes : N = 2,677; * denotes significance at 10% level; ** denotes significance at 5% level;
*** denotes significance at 1% level.
Source : Authors’ calculations using Fortune 1000 companies (see text).
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actuarial value of assets by its current liability. The table shows that plans
which converted to a hybrid plan were larger in terms of plan assets, as well
as in active and total participants. Plans that converted to hybrid plans also
had a higher median value for actives compared to retirees, and higher
mean and median funding levels. Finally, plans which converted were also
more likely not to be collectively bargained.
Whether the plan was converted in a specific year is used as a dependent
variable by the logit model for this multivariate analysis. Again, we offer one
set of estimates without year or industry controls; and a second includes
both, as follows:
yij ¼ aþ bFundingij þ bðActives=RetireesÞij þ bTotalPartij
þblogðTotAssetsÞij þ bCollectiveBargij þ bDummiesij þ eij ð3Þ
where i represents the pension plan from the Form 5500 filings and j
represents the year. The results in Table 11.8 for plan assets and being a
collectively bargained plan are positively associated and significant in both
specifications. Although previously we had seen a negative association
between collectively bargained and plan conversions, the fact that these
are larger firms may explain the positive association here. We also find that
funding is insignificant, suggesting that plan financial health does not
shape plan conversions.
Table 11.8 Logit regression analysis of the annual probability of hybrid plan
conversion in Form 5500 plans with 1,000+ participants: 2000–7
(1) (2)
Coefficient Std error Coefficient Std error
Funding 0.241 0.199 0.204 0.215
Actives/retirees 0.0001 0.0007 0.0002 0.0007
Total participants (000) 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
Ln(total assets) 0.414*** 0.063 0.412*** 0.065
Collective bargained plan 0.580*** 0.090 0.557*** 0.093
Year controls No Yes
Industry controls No Yes
2 log L 1,951.864 1,898.965
Notes : N = 18,907; * denotes significance at 10% level; ** denotes significance at 5% level;
*** denotes significance at 1% level.
Source : Authors’ calculations using Form 5500 plans with 1,000+ participants (see text).
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Fortune 1000 companies with added pension
information from Form 5500
Finally, we examine the sample of Fortune 1000 companies’ pension plans
found in the Form 5500 datafiles and the company and pension finance
information from the Towers Watson database. We again look at Fortune
1000 companies that existed in consecutive years and determine whether
or not they converted at least one of their traditional DB plans to a hybrid
plan. To consolidate the plan-level pension data from the Form 5500 to the
company-level information, we aggregated the pension plan information
for each Fortune 1000 company. We calculated per-plan weighted averages
of funding, total number of participants, and actives per retirees, using
total plan assets as the weight. If the company had at least one plan in the
Form 5500 data series identified as collectively bargained, we coded the
company as having at least some collective bargaining coverage. We
summed the number of nonfrozen plans that each Fortune 1000 company
offered.
Table 11.9 demonstrates that companies which converted at least one
plan to a hybrid plan tended to have larger plans, both in terms of total
participants and asset size. The median market value for companies that
converted at least one plan to a hybrid plan is larger than companies that
did not convert any of their traditional DB plans. Interestingly, companies
that converted at least one plan and companies that did not convert were
equally likely to have at least one collectively bargained plan.
We next estimate logit models using the integrated Fortune 1000
financial and the Form 5500 database, with the dependent variable
being equal to one if the plan was converted to a hybrid plan in the
specified year. The independent variables used are weighted-average
funding level, weighted average of actives divided by retirees, whether
the company offers a collectively bargained plan or not, weighted average
of total participants, average of plan assets, an indicator of whether the
sponsor offers at least three plans, PBO and pension assets minus PBO
both relative to market value, EPS, and logarithm of market value. The
general regression is as follows:
y ¼ bWeightedAvgFundingij þ bðWeightedAvgActives=RetireesÞij
þbCollBargIndij þ bAvgTotalParticipantsij þ blogðAvgPlanAssetsÞij
þbThreePlanIndij þ bðPBO=MktValÞij þ bEPSij logðMktValÞij
þbDummiesij þ eij
ð4Þ
where i represents the Fortune 1000 company and j represents the year.
Table 11.10 shows one model that excludes year and industry controls, and
a second model that includes both year and industry controls.
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Table 11.9 Plan features by conversion status for Form 5500 pension plans
sponsored by Fortune 1000 companies: 2000–7
Did not convert to
a hybrid plan
Converted to a
hybrid plan
Mean Median Mean Median
Weighted-average funding level 0.90 0.87 0.88 0.83
Weighted-average actives/retirees 6.58 2.08 12.93 1.90
1+ plan collectively bargained 0.35 0 0.46 0
Weighted-average total participants per plan 15,691 5,910 25,188 5,068
Average plan assets ($000) 1,162,491 334,329 3,527,991 543,750
No. of plans offered 1.42 1 1.61 1
PBO/market value 0.69 0.14 0.65 0.43
(Total pension assets—PBO)/market value 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.05
EPS 21.94 1.83 1.55 1.56
Market value ($000) 21,298 5,793 13,564 6,149
Notes : Number that did not convert to hybrid = 1,347; number that did = 28. All dollar values in
$ 2010.
Source : Authors’ calculations (see text).
Table 11.10 Plan conversion logit regression results for Fortune 1000 companies
with plans found in the Form 5500: 2000–7
(1) (2)
Coefficient Std
error
Coefficient Std
error
Weighted-average funding level 0.511 0.796 0.704 0.666
Weighted-average actives/retirees 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.004
Plan collectively bargained 0.497*** 0.166 0.464*** 0.175
Weighted average total participants/
plan (000)
0.000 0.000 0.006** 0.003
Ln(average % of plan assets) 0.079 0.147 0.168 0.157
3+ indicator 0.142 0.286 0.198 0.291
PBO/market value 2.334*** 0.461 2.193*** 0.487
(Total pension assets—PBO)/market
value
3.167*** 2.148 2.12 2.317
EPS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ln(market value) 0.158 0.132 0.123 0.139
Year controls No Yes
Industry controls No Yes
2 log L 559.605 5,419.408
Note : N = 1,375; * denotes significance at 10% level; ** denotes significance at 5% level;
*** denotes significance at 1% level.
Source : Authors’ calculations using Form 5500 plans with 1,000+ participants (see text).
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In both models, coefficients on plan obligations and plan overall finan-
cial status (Assets minus PBO) are positively and significantly associated
with converting at least one plan to a hybrid. Interestingly, having at least
one plan that is collectively bargained is also positively and statistically
significantly associated with converting to a hybrid plan. In the second
regression, one more variable becomes significant.
Conclusion
This chapter examines the determinants of plan conversions from tradi-
tional DB plans to hybrid plans using three data sources, focusing particu-
larly on firms on the Fortune 1000 lists from 2000 to 2009. From this set, we
identify whether they sponsored a pension plan and if they converted at
least one of their plans from a traditional DB to a hybrid plan. Company
financial information in annual 10-K reports helps understand whether the
firm’s financial status and that of their pension plans played a role in
converting to a hybrid plan. We conclude that the overall cost of pension
plans and financial health of the pension plans was not associated with
hybrid conversion. Nevertheless, the plan sponsor’s market value, indica-
tive of how well the overall company is doing, was strongly associated with
the probability of converting to a hybrid plan. We also found that DB plans
with better funding were more likely to be converted to hybrid plans, as
were larger plans and those that were collectively bargained. These results
suggest that companies did not convert to hybrid plans because the pen-
sion plans were not financially sound. Finally, the pension obligations
relative to market share did influence the probability that firms converted
at least one plan to a hybrid plan.
The detailed examination of these data sources showed a relatively
high level of plan conversions until 2003, followed by three years of
relatively few conversions. After the passage of the PPA in 2006, large
employers have begun converting traditional DB plans to hybrid plans.
We believe that the uncertain legal environment and changing regu-
latory status of hybrid plans has substantially affected the number of
conversions. Finally, we speculate that the adverse economic climate of
the past few years may have altered the desirability of DC plans for
some workers, insofar as employees may now desire retirement benefits
with a greater degree of certainty. Such changes in worker preferences
may increase the demand for hybrid plans, relative to a move away
from a DB toward a DC plan.
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Endnotes
1. A detailed discussion of hybrid plans appears in Chapter 12 of McGill et al.
(2010). Hill et al. (2010) describe the key characteristics of hybrid plans.
2. Cf. Brown et al. (2000) and Clark and Munzenmaier (2001) for additional
discussion of early conversions to hybrid plans.
3. The PPA is a much broader bill that affects many aspects of plan design,
management, and funding. Hill et al. (2010) cover how the PPA relates to hybrid
plans.
4. Although the PPA offered some guidance, additional guidance was still needed.
In October 2010, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued final and proposed
regulations on the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) provisions relating to
hybrid pension plans, such as cash balance and pension equity plans (PEPs). The
final regulations mostly firmed up the rules proposed in 2007; the 2010 pro-
posed regulations focus on other issues, paying particular attention to interest-
crediting rates that satisfy the market-rate-of-return standard.
5. Using the indicators to separate hybrid plans and traditional DB plans may yield
a few misidentifications because some plans have a complicated plan design due
to multiple structures and various transition provisions. Unfortunately, we are
only able to remove plans that have no participants currently accruing benefits
(i.e. frozen plans). We cannot identify plans that are closed (i.e. plans that have
some participants who are not currently accruing further benefits because they
did not meet service/age requirements or they were hired after a certain date).
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